Question Two. Whether the Word assumed the Whole of Human Nature First and Immediately

47. In another way I ask, as to the fact, whether there was any medium of congruity between the Word and the assumed nature - and, in order to include both, namely both an intrinsic medium (as the soul) and an extrinsic one (as grace), I ask whether the Word assumed the whole of human nature first and immediately.

48. That he did not:

Because “he assumed the flesh by means of the soul,” Damascene Orthodox Faith chs. 62, 50, Augustine On the Christian Contest ch.18 n.20, (and the quote is in Lombard’s text, 3.3, 2.2 n.3).

49. Again, the part is prior, by way of generation, to the whole (as the incomplete is to the complete), according to the Commentator on Physics com.28 [“the parts of a thing in accord with its definition precede the thing in being”];     therefore likewise in the case of assumption, because the parts [sc. body and soul] were assumed in the order they were assumable; therefore etc     .

50. Further, “that is ‘prior’ where inference as to subsisting does not convert” [Categories 12.14a26-35]; but this inference holds, ‘he assumed the whole, therefore he assumed the parts’, but the converse does not hold.

51. Again, if he had assumed the whole first, then what he once assumed he would at some point have let go - as in death, because death was corruptive of the whole, for, if there was a true corruption, then the whole that was before did not exist. The consequence is manifest; the consequent seems false and contrary to Damascene ibid. ch.71 [“So although he died as man and his soul was divided from his uncontaminated flesh, yet his inseparable deity remained with both..., and neither was the one hypostasis in this way divided into two hypostases”].

52. Again, about the extrinsic medium, I argue as follows: human nature cannot be united to the Word by beatific union without the habit of grace, and this because both the union itself and the term of the union exceed the ability of created nature; therefore, since the hypostatic union exceeds more, because it is ‘supreme grace’ according to Augustine On the Trinity 13.19 n.24, the consequence is that it could not happen without grace.

53. On the contrary:

If this union were done first part by part, then it is not single.

54. Again, in that case the Word would have been an animal before he was man.

55. Again, as to the second point [sc. an extrinsic medium], the argument is as follows: the general in-falling [sc. creation] is into each nature according to its first existence, not through any intermediate habit in the nature; therefore similarly here, the special in-falling [sc. the assuming of human nature by the Word] will be into this nature first without any intermediate habit.

I. To the Question

56. In this question it is plain there are two questions: one about the intrinsic medium, namely whether any part was intermediate between the Word and the parts, or whether a part (or parts) were intermediate between the Word and the whole, or conversely whether the Word was intermediate between the whole and the parts; the second article is about the extrinsic medium, namely whether grace was the medium between this united nature and the term of the union.

A. About the Intrinsic Medium

1. The Opinion of Others

57. [Exposition of the opinion] - As to the first article, what is said is that the Word assumed the body by the intermediary of the soul [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, Henry of Ghent].

58. And the point is expounded in the following way [Henry of Ghent], that the soul was first assumed by the Word, and in the second instant the soul was united with the body, and thereby the Word in the second instant unites the body to his person by the intermediary of the soul, which he united to himself first.

59. Likewise, as to the parts compared with the whole, what is said is that, in the order of execution, the parts were assumed first, but in the order of intention the Word first assumed the whole, just as the whole is by intention prior to the parts.

60. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against the first of these points [n.58], namely about the soul in respect of the body, I argue:

That it seems to follow that Christ is not a man first; for [Henry] argues, against the opinion of the Master of the Sentences, that Christ was not a man during the Triduum [the three days in the tomb], because ‘the assumer is not a man save because what is assumed is a man’ - which can, if it be well understood, be expounded as ‘because what is assumed is human nature’; therefore if what is first assumed is not human nature but a part of human nature, the assumer will not be first a man and, as he is disposed to the whole and the parts in the second instant of assumption, so is he disposed now as well [sc. the assumer is not first a man either before he assumes all the parts of human nature or after he has done so, for, by supposition, he is first a part of human nature and only secondly the whole of it]; therefore now too he is not first a man as Socrates is first a man - but this seems unacceptable, since there seems to be no difference in idea on the part of the predicate in the one case [sc. Christ is a man] and in the other [sc. Socrates is a man], although there is a different mode of predicating, as will be touched on below in d.7 nn.16-17. Indeed further, second, it seems to follow that Christ is not a man; the proof is that, if an accident were a composite of essential parts, of a potential a and an actual b, the subject would not be denominated by the accident, because it would be denominated by b alone - for if it were a, it would be a subject in respect of an accident composed of a and b, because a is denominated actually by b; therefore, by similarity, a human nature composed of soul and body is not asserted denominatively of the Word because of the mere union of the soul with the Word, which union is supposed to be the idea of such denomination, for only then [sc. when body is united with soul] could the body be called ‘man’.This argument is stated rather elliptically, but its point seems to be as follows. Suppose that the accident ‘brown’ in ‘brown horse’ were a composite of the subject and the quality, and that the subject were actual and the quality potential with respect to the subject. This supposition is strictly false, for ‘brown’, as an accident said concretely, is actual and actually includes the subject, though obliquely and not directly. However, it creates a parallel with Henry’s supposition about the Word’s assumption of human nature. For, if the accident ‘brown’ is so understood then it is potentially brown before being united to horse and actually brown afterwards (as the body is potentially human before being united to the soul in the Word and actually so afterwards), so that ‘brown’ gets its meaning from ‘brown horse’. ‘Horse’, then, cannot properly be called ‘brown’ for, as subject, it is not the accident but the subject of the accident, and the subject, as such, does not include the accident in its idea. The same problem applies to Henry’s supposition. For since, according to Henry, the Word assumes the soul first and the body through the soul, the Word plus soul is the subject of body. But Henry also says that body in separation from soul (and soul in separation from body) is not human nature, because Christ was not properly a man when his body and soul were separated during the three days in the grave. The assumed body, then, in order to be human body, must include soul in its idea and must mean something like ‘bodied soul’. Thus the assumed body directly includes the subject in its idea, for its subject is the Word plus soul, and, just as the horse cannot properly be the subject of brown and be called brown if ‘brown’ means ‘brown horse’, so the Word plus soul cannot properly be the subject of man and be called man if ‘man’ means ‘bodied soul’. Henry’s supposition, then, must be false and, in order for the Word properly to be called man, the Word must be the subject of ‘bodied soul’ directly and not through the soul, which is to say that the Word must assume soul and body immediately and not the second through the first. ³¹

61. Again, incommunicability belongs to the idea of person, and this by reason of the ‘by what’ as has frequently been expounded [3 d.1 n.50, 1 d.2 nn.379-380, d.23 nn.15-16]; this [incommunicability] belongs more to matter than to form, because form is communicated to matter in the whole as giving being to matter; therefore, just as this incommunicability in a nature that is a person in itself is appropriated more to the body than to the soul, so, when a nature is a person in another, then it seems (if there is any order in this case) that the dependence of the body - in order for it to be thus subsistent in itself - is terminated before the dependence of the soul is.

62. Further third: a body is of a nature to subsist in itself; therefore this ‘subsisting in itself’ is not supplied in a body unless the body is assumed directly; for the body is capable of such assumption just as it is capable too of subsistence in itself; when therefore the union of the soul with the Word exists, then, since the body is not immediately assumed through that union, the potency in the body to be assumed by the Father still exists, and thus the same man may be assumed by two persons - which seems unacceptable because in this way no person will be the man. And yet from these parts, when united, the man exists; therefore he is a man and not a person unless he is a person in himself - which is unacceptable because then the parts will be hypostasized twice, namely intrinsically and extrinsically.

63. Further, there would have then been a new assumption in death, because then the body was united with the Word immediately and not united through the soul, because its order to the soul was in potency only.

64. Further, he was not a man because of these two unions, as was shown in the second reason [n.61], so a third union is required, which would first be the union of the whole, and because of this third union the Word would be a man; but this third union is sufficient by itself without the other two; therefore the other two are superfluous.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

65. As concerns this article [n.56], therefore, a distinction can be drawn about the medium; for just as - between an agent and its action or effect - something can be posited to be medium either as the ‘what’ (as the proximate agent between the remote agent and the effect) or as the ‘by what’ (as the form of the agent), so between the recipient and the received a double medium can be posited, a ‘what’ and a ‘by what’. For just as something can be the reason of acting for something, so can something be the reason of receiving for something; and the medium with respect to the reception of an accident can sometimes be the proper form of the receiver, just as a subject first receives its proper accident through its proper form (as through its proper reason of receiving).

66. As to the issue at hand it can be said that, in the passive assumption of human nature into the Word, there was no medium as ‘what’ between the Word and the whole human nature, but the whole human nature was assumed immediately.

67. The proof is as follows, that what, if left to itself, has first the capacity to be a person in itself, is first a person in another when it is assumed, because the divine personhood supplies the place of the thing’s own personhood; the whole human nature, if left to itself, and not a part or parts of it, is in this way first and immediately able to be a person;     therefore etc     .

68. The proof of the major is that the whole human nature is a person in another or by another in the same instant of nature in which, if left to itself, it would be a person in itself; for it is not of a nature to be assumed before that instant (because it was not a singular nature before that instant), and it is not assumed after that instant (because after that instant it would be person by itself).

69. The proof of the minor is that in the same instant of nature in which the matter or the form precedes the whole, neither the matter nor the form is of a nature to be a person; but when the whole nature exists from these united parts, then first is the thus united whole a person, if it is not impeded by the assumer.

70. Speaking of medium in the second way [n.65], namely as ‘by what’, one can concede that the soul is the medium in the assumption by the Word - and this with respect to the whole nature, because the soul is the formal idea of this nature, whereby the nature is capable of being united (just as the soul is the formal idea whereby a man, not only as efficient principle but also as proximate subject, is formally capable of laughter); and just as the soul is the form of the subject, so it can be the form that constitutes the nature, and yet it is the proper reason for the whole nature of receiving this union, because it is the proper reason constituting the whole that is receptive of the union. Nor on this account need the soul be first assumed as the ‘what’, just as neither is the soul capable of laughter as the ‘what’, although it is the ‘by what’ a man is capable of laughter.

71. And by reason of this idea of being medium can the whole nature truly be said to be assumed through the soul, such that the ‘through’ states with respect to the predicate the circumstance of quasi material cause, although, with respect to what is determined through the soul, it states the formal cause -just as also in the statement, ‘man is capable of laughter through the rational soul’, the form of the soul is indicated to be quasi material with respect to the predicate. In this way too the soul can be conceded to be the medium between the flesh and the Word, because the soul is the total form of the nature assumed first and is, for this reason, the medium ‘by which’ the whole nature is what it is and is assumable and is assumed; and the soul is hereby itself assumed, because it is part of the nature assumed first. Thus too is the flesh in its own way assumable and assumed.

3. Three Doubts against Scotus’ Opinion

a. Statement of the Doubts

72. But there is, as to the first member of the distinction [n.65], a doubt here what the nature is that is said to be assumed first [nn.66-67], namely whether it is some being other than the parts. The Commentator, Physics 1 com.17, seems to say that, although a whole is other than the parts or other than each part separately, yet it is not other than all the parts together; and if this were so, since there is no real assumption save of a real thing, then the assuming of the whole would be nothing other than the assuming of all the parts. Also, if the whole is a being other than the parts, there is a doubt whether it is other by some absolute entity or by some relative one. And, third, there is a doubt whether there is any form of the whole other than the form that is a part.

b. Solution of the Doubts

73. [As to the first doubt] - As to the first doubt, I show that a whole is a being different from all of the parts jointly and separately.

First, because otherwise the difference between ‘whole’ and ‘one’ in Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-33 would not be true, for it is said there that a single whole that is per se one is other than a single whole that is one by aggregation (as a pile or a heap), and this latter whole is merely its parts. The inferred consequent seems unacceptable, first from Metaphysics ibid. [where it is said that a heap has no cause of its being one but a whole does], and second because also a whole that is per accidens one is more one than a whole by aggregation and less one than a whole that is per se one - and yet a whole that is per accidens one is not merely its parts, for, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.12.1037b14-18 ‘On the Unity of Definition’, a white man is a ‘one something’ by the fact that whiteness is in the man; he would not therefore be such a single whole if whiteness did not inform him.

74. Further, the per se ‘term to which’ of generation is something that has its proper entity, because generation proceeds to the being of its proper term; but the whole, not one or other part of it, is the ‘term to which’ of generation; indeed, if each part were to pre-exist and then first be united, the generation or production would no less be of the very composite - just as, in the case of resurrection, given that both the soul and the body as to their entity pre-existed, resuscitation would still be of the whole composite; but resuscitation would not be to the being of the body or of the soul, nor to both beings; therefore to some third thing different from them.

75. Third, one can argue similarly about corruption, following the argument of the Philosopher at the end of Metaphysics 7 (17.1041b11-17), because a and b remain and not ab, and the same thing cannot really remain and not really remain, so ab is something other really than a and b; therefore, since so it is in the case of all per se composites, namely that it is not repugnant to the idea of parts that they should remain and the whole not, therefore there will be some entity proper to the whole itself that is different from the entity of the parts.

76. Again fourth, because otherwise [sc. if what is asserted in the first paragraph of n.73 is not true] nothing would be per se caused by the intrinsic causes, namely by matter and form; for because these causes cause this composite, it is plain that these causes are parts of the thing caused; but these causes are not parts of the other part nor of both parts, because neither one nor both of them are caused, for they are themselves the first causes and the first principles of the thing;     therefore etc     .

77. Again, it would follow, fifth, that there was no being where the proper feature and operation or any proper accident would per se exist, because these exist in the species and not in the matter or form of the species, nor in both matter and form together save as matter and form are a unity in some per se whole.

78. [To the second doubt] - About the second doubt [n.72], I say that a whole is also a different being and with a different absolute entity, because a mere respect would not suffice for calling some whole being a per se one, for in the case of a single whole that is per accidens one there is a per se respect - and an essential respect - between part and part, as is plain of the dependence of an accident on a subject; likewise, the quiddities of all absolutes, as including matter and form and as being definable (for they are definable species as such) are not just relative entities formally, which, however, they would have to be if the proper entity of a whole were a respect.

79. This conclusion also follows from the reasons given for the first doubt [nn.73-77], for no generation is per se toward a respect as to the term to which [n.74]; nor either is corruption from a mere respect as from the term from which [n.75]; nor are absolute causes causes of something merely relational [n.76]; nor does a proper feature follow a whole precisely insofar as the whole is relational, nor either does a proper operation so follow nor any absolute accident [n.77]; nor finally does being able to assign a specific difference for all quiddities seem possible, because positing a difference merely of respects between united parts does not seem possible [n.73]. Also, as to the issue at hand, it does not seem possible for a respect to be the proper idea of founding a relation of union with the Word - which, however, should be possible when positing that the whole is assumed in the way before stated [nn.65-71], if the entity of the whole, as distinct from the parts, not be posited as being absolute.

80. [To the third doubt] - As to the third doubt I say that if in a whole there is understood to be, aside from the form of the part (of which sort in man is the intellective soul), another form supervening on it as it were that is also something of the whole itself and yet is called the form of the whole by distinguishing this form from the form of the part (because it more completely constitutes the whole than the other form does), then this understanding is false; for in that case there would be in man some form constituting man that is more perfect than the intellective soul, which is unacceptable. Likewise, if this third doubt rests on a reason taken from the perfection of the whole, namely that a one would not be made from the matter and form (each of which is a part) save through some form uniting these parts, which form would be the form of the whole, then this reason would entail a process to infinity; for I ask, as to this form, how it makes a one along with the matter and form of a part. If it does so of itself, then the same could be granted about the form of a part, that it is of itself of a nature to make a one along with the matter; if it does so through something else, there will be a process to infinity.

81. I say then that over and above the form that perfects the matter and is thereby said to be a form of a part (and understanding this to be the ultimate form, when positing several forms in the same thing), there is no need to posit some form perfecting as it were both the matter and form, because matter and form are in the whole not parts of the same idea or elements that are perfectible by some third act, but one [sc. matter] is the perfectible proper and the other [sc. form] is act; and this reason is why they make a per se one, from Metaphysics 8.6.1045a7-8, 23-25.Aristotle: “As to the doubt what the cause is of being a one..., if this is matter but that form, and this indeed is in potency but that in act, the question asked will seem no longer in doubt.” Scotus’ commentary ad loc., sect.1 ch.6 n.37: “One must note that the strength of this solution stands in this fact.that man.is per se one insofar as he is composed of matter and form as of potency and act; nor is any cause to be sought why these make a one other than that the former is as potency while the latter is as act.” ³²

82. If however the form of the whole is understood not to be something constituting the whole but to be the whole nature, as the quiddity, then in this way it can well be conceded that the form of the whole is other than the form of a part and that the nature of quiddity can be called form (the point is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.2.1013a26-27, ‘On Cause’Aristotle, “But in another way cause is said to be the species [form] and exemplar; this then is the idea of the ‘what it was to be’ [the quiddity].” Scotus’ commentary ad loc., sect.1 ch.2 n.17, “For form belongs most of all to the quiddity of a thing. One must note that the form of a thing is called the species, insofar as it is the principle of being and of specification.” ³³); but that there is some form other than the form of a part is plain from the first article here touched on [nn.73-75].

83. But in respect of what is it the form?

I reply by saying that it is the form in respect of the whole composite, not indeed the informing form but the form whereby the composite is a quidditative being; and in this way the whole being formally is the form of the whole (the way a white thing is said to be white by whiteness); not indeed that the form of the whole is as it were the cause of it, causing the whole as it were along with the matter and the partial form, but it is the whole itself precisely considered, in the way that Avicenna speaks of it in his Metaphysics 5 ch.1, “horseness is only horseness.”Avicenna, “Although the universal itself would be man or horse, the intention in this case is different, additional to the intentionality that is humanity or horseness; for the definition of horseness is other than the definition of universality, and universality is not included in the definition of horseness... Horseness, therefore, from the fact that many things come together in its definition, is common but, from the fact it is taken along with indicated properties and accidents, it is singular. Horseness then in itself is just horseness. For humanity itself, from the fact it is humanity, is something additional to any of the things mentioned [sc. the accidents and properties of this man], and in its definition nothing is taken but humanity alone.” ³⁴

84. And if you ask for the causes of this entity, I say that it is a third from its causes and comes from them causally and not from other causes; and as to why such and such causes cause and constitute a third entity, different from themselves, which is a per se one [sc. in the case of substance], and as to why other causes cause a third entity, different from themselves, which is not a per se one [sc. in the case of substance and accident], there is no reason other than that the former entities of causes are such as they are and that the latter are of a different idea. The Philosopher insinuates this in Metaphysics 8 [n.81] where, responding to a question about the unity of the composite, how from matter and form it becomes a per se one, he assigns as cause that ‘this is per se act, that is per se potency’; and just as this is act per se and that potency per se, so this whole is one per se; and just as this is act per accidens and that potency per accidens, so this constituted whole is one per accidens. But as to why this entity is act per se with respect to this thing and another entity is only per accidens with respect to something else has no reason other than that an entity of this sort is ‘this entity’; for, just as between the hot and heating there is no middle in genus of efficient cause, so neither between this form and thus informing [sc. informing a substance as opposed to a substance and accident] is there any middle in genus of formal cause; but just as the hot heats insofar as it is hot and not because of anything else, so the soul thus perfects and thus constitutes insofar as it is soul.

85. It is thus plain, therefore, with respect to this doubt [sc. the third, nn.72, 80], that there is a medium of congruity [nn. 46-47] of the union of human nature with the Word, namely that the medium is the whole nature constituted from the parts, which is a certain absolute third thing, different from each and both of the parts jointly and separately.

c. To the Authority of the Commentator Adduced in the First Doubt

86. And therefore the remark that was adduced from the Commentator on the Physics [n.72], namely that ‘the matter and form together’ are the same as ‘the whole’ and conversely, has no weight. For it fails in this case as in others by reason of the fact that no distinction is drawn between what is per se and what concurs as a necessary requisite; the ‘to be’ indeed of the whole is necessarily accompanied by the union of the parts and conversely, and yet the union is not the ‘to be’, because union is a respect and ‘to be’ is an absolute - just as the order of efficient causes, when there are many efficient causes that are ordered and in proximity to each other, is a necessary prerequisite for the causing of an effect, and yet the order or the proximity are not the ‘to be’ of the effect but the absolute ‘to be’ alone is. Nor is it unacceptable that some absolute depend on and prerequire - or at any rate in some way co-require - some respect; for universally any absolute that is caused by several causes necessarily pre-requires the union and proximity of those causes in their causing. And thus here, in the case of the hypostatic union, it can be the case that the whole entity of the whole is absolute even though it necessarily prerequire or co-require the union of the absolute parts.

B. About the Extrinsic Medium

87. [The opinion of others] - As to the second principal article [n.56], about the extrinsic medium, the position is taken [Aquinas, Bonaventure] that grace was the medium of congruity in this [hypostatic] union.

88. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this position I argue first that in the instant of nature in which the nature would be a person in itself if it were not assumed, it would, in the same instant, be a person in another when it is assumed (this was made clear in the first article [n.56]); but it would naturally first be a person in itself before it had the habit of grace, because the habit is the principle of operating and consequently is the perfection of that to which operating belongs; but to operate belongs to a supposit; therefore the nature would first naturally have the idea of supposit in itself before it had any grace or habit, which alone is the principle of operating. Therefore when it is assumed too it is naturally united first before grace is given to it; therefore grace is not the medium.

89. There is also a confirmation, because what belongs in itself to another belongs to it before something else does if that something else belongs to it per accidens; nature, if left to itself, would be a person in itself and of itself; therefore that would belong to nature first before the accidental habit did.

90. Again, John 1.14, “We saw his glory as of the only begotten from the Father” - where John seems to say that ‘to be only begotten’ is the proximate reason for the congruence whereby he [the Lord] has the fullness of grace; therefore the nature was subsistent in the Word before so great a grace was conferred on it, because it would seem improper for so great a fullness of grace to be conferred on the nature in an instant in which the nature is understood not to be united with the Word.

91. Further, the grace would not formally unite [nature with the Word] (as is plain), so grace would be disposed in idea of a disposition in the other extreme; but this is false,a because the nature itself, where grace is, is a person, and for that reason all its accidents are united to the person accidentally and mediately; therefore in the case of this union no accident could have been the medium (just as neither is whiteness the medium in the union of surface with body).

a.a [Interpolation] because the real and actual existence of an accident presupposes, in the order of nature, the real existence of the subject; but grace is in the soul of Christ as an accident in a subject; therefore its real and actual existence presupposes the real existence of the soul. But the soul of Christ only had real existence in the Word; therefore the soul was assumed by the Word first in the order of nature before it was the subject of grace.

II. To the Principal Arguments

92. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.48] the answer is plain, because the authorities are to be understood as speaking about the medium ‘by which’ and not the medium ‘which’.

93. To the second [n.49] I say that something can be prior in itself to another when not comparing them to a third thing, as the parts of my nature are prior to my whole nature in the order of generation or execution, but not when comparing them to being a person, because my parts are not a person before my whole nature is. So too is it in the case of being a person in an extraneous person; and the reason is that, in the instant of nature in which the whole is whole, it is able to be a person in itself or in another - and therefore, whatever precedes it does not precede in ability to be a person, because it is not, as prior, able to be a person.

94. To the next [n.50] I say that not everything that is prior in consequence is naturally prior, that is, causally prior (or prior as something is said to be prior in execution by priority of material cause, or said to be prior in intention by priority of formal cause). Likewise, according to the Philosopher in the Categories 12.14b11-22,Aristotle, “...there is another way of being prior; for, in the case of things that convert according to consequence of essence, that which is in some way cause of the other is rightly said to be prior in nature., for being a man converts in consequence of substance with true speech about it.; but the thing seems to be in some way the cause that the speech is true, for speech is said to be true or false because the thing is or is not.” ³⁵ what is prior in causality can be simultaneous in consequence, “for being a man converts in consequence with true speech about man,” and yet the being of the thing is prior in causality, “for speech is true or false by the fact that the thing is or is not.” So here, priority in consequence can stand along with non-priority in causing, as is universally the case with an accident that is necessarily consequent to a number of things, as hot is to fire and air; that is why fire and air are consequent according to consequence and yet in causality the hot is posterior to both of them; so it is in the issue at hand, that although the being-assumed of the parts follows the being-assumed of the whole and not conversely, yet the second is not prior in causality. However, it could be said that, in the way in which the parts are assumed, the being-assumed of the parts and the being-assumed of the whole are convertible.

95. To the next [n.51] I say that if Christ truly died then, since the corruption of the body is not nothing, one can truly say that he had some entity in death that he did not have alive; but he did not, as far as concerns the essential parts of the nature, put aside the nature he assumed. And such is the understanding of Damascene (as is plain there in ch.71), and not something different; he means in ch.73Damascene, “In death.neither soul nor body had their own hypostasis besides that of the Word, but there was always the one hypostasis of the Word and not two.” ³⁶ that the soul and body in death were never in their own hypostasis but in that of the Word.

96. But a doubt remains, because it seems that in death there was a new assumption of a part in itself that was not united before.

97. On this point see the solution in d.16 n.39 infra.

98. To the last argument [n.52] I say that, if ‘grace’ is taken for the gratuitous will of God, then God is said to do this from grace because he is said to do everything gratuitously that is included the less in a thing and exceeds the faculty of it the more; and, in this way, because ‘subsisting in the word’ exceeds the faculty of created nature, so God does this gratuitously and with supreme grace, that is, with his supreme condescending gratuitous will, because conferring on nature what nature can least attain of itself and what most exceeds it. But if ‘grace’ is understood as an informing created habit, then, although this is concomitant to the united nature, it is yet not necessary for the union. And so, when it is then argued [n.52], as by an argument a minore, that grace is necessary for the beatific union, I say that, as to the hypostatic union, the conclusion does not follow, because beatific union is through operation and second act, and for this union the soul has no power unless it have the form [sc. grace] - but this [hypostatic] union is to first existence, and for this no accident in the united nature is presupposed, just as also for first supernatural existence, which is had through the habit of grace, nothing further raising up the nature is required; for thus there would be a process to infinity, as always one natural thing would be disposing it for another. And just as what gives first act in this case could perfect nature immediately, so can the existence communicated by the Word be the immediate principle of the [hypostatic] union.